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In the Wake of Terra Nullius?
Colin Perrin & Bernhard Ripperger
Terra nullius is the principle of a violence that inheres in every origin.
And, in its wake, there is no law, no text, no culture, free of that violence.
The origin is no accident. Terra nullius is not an historical error. OUf
conceptuaHegacy is the unsettled and unsettling history of this violence.
It demands critical... thinking. Or else... we are condemned to repeat
this origin again and again.

The previous issue of Law • Text • Culture, under the special
editorship of Colin Perrin, thus foreshadowed and forearmed
itself. It was perhaps a frame or ergon and a claim to identity or
community to which membership was invited (and in the spirit
of which this Forum provides a space for: continuing exchange).
One such contribution to that issue came from Bernhard
Ripperger, who took this manifesto as the origin and ground of
his own critique. For Ripperger, the very origin of In the ~ke of
Terra Nullius, by assuming the i~possibility of a ground of
legitimacy of law "free of that violence", could only serve as
collusion or indulgence. Ripperger argued that legal legitimacy,
though only ever partial, was not either circular or oxymoronic.
Ironically, then, he developed this argument precisely by. focusing
on the prospectus quoted above as itselfa kind oforigin without
foundation - a law of the text.
There followed an exchange between Ripperger (BR) and
Perrin (CP), an edited version ofwhich is reproduced below. It is
an argument which centres around the notions of violence and
unsettlement, silence, disaster, and experience. What began as
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an interlocution of the synopsis or prospectus of the journal
became an interlocution of its critique: Perrin argues strongly in
defence ofa position which seeks to escape any crude dichotomy
between legitimate/illegitimate, inside/outside, same/other, thus
to attempt to "think otherwise" as a way of neither legitimating
the law of the past, nor of repeating its claims to authority and
violence in the name of a present justic~ or history. Ripperger
insists that there is always a ground to philosophy, always a claim
to legitimacy, whether it is acknowledged or not. For Ripperger,
a claim oflegitimacy is always contingent and relative, but always
possible too, particularly ifit is grounded not in abstract concepts
but in the concrete experience of suffering of individuals.
The debate - in which nothing is settled - focuses on how
conceptual distinctions matter to the way we act in the world and
whether a practice of justice or the experience of suffering can
somehow finesse or overcome the estrangement between law and
the other.

The relationship of law, text, and culture, to violence is of
enduring interest to this journal. The following, it is hoped, will
shed further light on what is at stake in the study of the claim of
sovereignty of Western law which the previous issue of Law •
Text • Culture addressed.

-Desmond Manderson
CP: I disagree that what you have called an 'economy of
violence' can be taken as 'implied' by my editorial prospectus for
In the wake o/Terra Nullius. Whilst I can - and will- point out,
in the terms of that prospectus, why I disagree, this may well
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miss what I take to be the basis of such a 'reading' in your own
argument for a 'normative ground' as the pre-requisite of any
critique ofviolence. What this comes down to, as I see it, is that
- given the explicit absence of such a ground in my prospectusyou have been unable to regard it as anything but, as you say,
implying an 'economy of violence' or else secretly maintaining
such a ground.

I will add right away, though, that it is exactly this either!
or - ground or no ground, openness or closure, the
straightforward possibility or impossibility of an 'outside' to such
an economy- which is my concern.
Perhaps, then, this is why you have been unable to read
any other possibility into the following. First, my claim that 'there
is no law, text, culture free of violence' - when this does not, of
course, imply that these are equated with violence (only that
they are not simply non-violent). Second, my invitation to a
'thinking' that is pitched against (what you call) the 'fatalism' of
(what I call) 'the preservation of existing m'eanings' (hence:
'thinking demands' something other... Qr else we are condemned
to repetition). Third, my contention that an 'economy ofviolence'
is both 'unsettled and unsettling' (which is to say, as you rightly
suspect, that what is being invoked here is not a closure or a
totality - although it is also not the secret invocation of a
'normative ground' (this is, as I see it, is the central point between
us and I will come back to it)). Fourth, .my suggestion that what
is required is a 'thinking through' (of) this unsettlement (in all of
the difficulty impJied here - according to the more or less
psychoanalytic notion of 'working through - as, for example,
both a thinking 'with' and a thinking 'past').
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BR: My argument is, in effect, that there is a normative
ground to every theor}', whether it is recognised theoretically or
not. My either/or is therefore more in relation to an evaluation
of theoretical resources; either a theory can acknowledge this
ground, or it cannot and so attempts to conceal it. My interest is
in the possible practical effects that flow when a lack in theory is
projected as an absence or lack in its object.
CP: OK, but I still disagree with this either/or because my
point here ~ bearing upon what seems to be the undue haste of
your (and' - is, in a sense, against that of a concealment which
proceeds via 'acknowledgment': such chachere it is rather out of
'a lack in theory' that 'the object' arises.
Essen dally, I think that it is this 'conception' of
'unsettlement' (not, as you say, just that 'one' is unsettled, as if it
were a m·aner of conscience, but that 'our conceptual legacy' is,
in itself- again, I will come to this - unsettled) which lies at the
heart of the matter. At least, in my own work, it is something
like this conception that I have been struggling to elaborate, not
only against the possibility ofa 'ground', an 'outside' ofeconomy;
discourse, etc. but against the claim to this impossibility.
There is a certain irony here for your reading attributes to
my prospectus for In the '\ftake ofTerra Nulliusan implied position
- that of an economy of violence - (which, in the names of
,construCtlVism,
. . , (exc1US Ion
. ", re IatlVlsm
.. , and·Indee,
d 'FoucauI;t'
(and here Iwouldinsist upon Derrida against Foucault or, along
the lines of impossibility that you indicate, Foucault against
Foucault) the problematization ofwhich hs been at least the subtext of all of my work to date.
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This conception ofunsetrlementwhich I am trying to work
out is not unrelated to what Derrida has called a 'lapse' in lawl
economy (from L.lapsus- to slip), or indeed what he calls justice
in his paper 'Force of Law'.
What I am trying to imply, therefore, is something like
the impossible closure of economy - the 'failure' of language or
law in their own terms, and so in terms of their claims to truth,
and to justice: claims which, it seems to me, are necessary for the
very integrity of law (as law), or for language (as language);
necessary, that is, for their very being. Hence, my argument is
that their unsettlement devolves upon a kind of 'internal'
(although this term is problematised by the 'lack' of closure that
I am trying to describe) contradictionltension. Such that the
violence according to which they are 'constituted' (but now never
fully) pervades them as a 'lack'; of integrity: as, for example, a
silence in law, Of, indeed, what Stanner has called a "great...
silence" in Australian history.

BR: I agree that there is an impossibility of closure of an
economy of violence - my argument is that the whole idea of
such an economy betrays (in both senses - it presents and wrongs)
its normative commitments while eliminating the theoretical
possibility of conceiving their grounds. Note that the inadequacy
of the 'concept' to do justice to this sphere of normativity does
nothing (well not much) to eliminate it- though it does tend to
legitimate social practices that do.
This is my concern - the reduction ofthe problem ofjustice
to the critique of the failure ofmetaphysics to secure the identity
of the concept and the non-conceptual; my starting point is after

231

Perrin" & Ripperger

the realisation of the inadequacy ofthis ambition of metaphysics
and so any argument I may have is an attempt to dialectically
transform the problem ofjustice (meaning etc) itself-aft~rwhich,
to some extent, I feel the answers are actually unavoidable.
CP: When you say that 'the inadequacy of the "concept"
to do justice to this sphere does nothing (well not much) to
eliminate that sphere', .I agree. But my point is slightly, but I
suspect crucially, different: this 'sphere' arises because of the
inadequacy of the concept. Perhaps, then, one could say that the
concept is not 'simply' inadequate: such that my focus, as you
say, upon the failure of metaphysics might be considered as a
focus upon the way in which it does not ~simply' fail.
I have not intended 'unsettlement' to be taken as 'effusively'
as you seem to suspect. Tbe term is not, of course, accidental
insofar as it evokes the quite precise place of terra nullius as the
basis of a supposedly legal settlement: the classification of the
colony (recalling Cooper v Stuart. 'without settled inhabitants o~
settled law'), but also the sense of an economic settlement and,
of course, the sense of feeling settJed/setcJing in, which opens
onto the broader issues of colonial and national identity.
BR: My concern is that something like 'unsettlement' or
justice as aporia involve drawing improper conclusions from
otherwise sound(ish) arguments. I doubt that such ideas, as they
are, could explain how or why theoretical attention is cast on
any given issue. That is, I fail to see how such an effusive notion
could have ever revealed that the 'law of history' governing the
oppression of indigenous people was terra nullius.
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As I say in my paper, approaches such as yours demonstrate
a remarkable sensitivity to violation etc, but I have yet to be
convinced that they have the theoretical resources to account for
such sensitivity - Ie they draw on a normative insight!ground
that they simultaneously conceal due to a conceptual inadequacy.
CP: With respect to normativity and the possibility of a
ground, it seems to me that it is on the basis of what I can only
presume amounts to a language that would be true (or, as I
understand it, 'expressive' in Benjamin's terms) that you could
contend - on the basis, I am guessing, of its 'recognition' of
Indigenous Peoples - that Mabo is 'right'.. Here, then, I read
something like a demand for purity - now that of a ground - in
your own account. And whilst I appreciate your many reservations
with respect to 'fallibility' and that such a ground is 'never pure',
I am left wondering what the latter might mean if not the
impossibility ofsuch a ground, which is to say ofthe non-violent
as such.
BR: The ·'impossibility ofthe non-violent as such' is exactly
what I mean by an effusive ground for critique. How do you get
from that 'non..place' to terra nullius? I suggest that it is the
experience of suffering that creates the potential for insight into
the necessary conditions of an undamaged life - but there is no
need to 'ontologise' these, either positively or negatively. My
argument is that Mabo is right to the extent that it recognises
that a law of history which has governed relations between
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples breaches one of those
conditions. This does not mean that Mabo is 'juse - even ifwe
accept that there can never be a justice which can redeem the
suffering caused by past wrongs, this particular decision is too
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constrained by a range of factors to 'remedy' current wrongs.
However, the decision is no doubt 'right' in terms of it .being
better than a decision that would have reinscribed 'undisturbed'
(to the extent this is possible - which would be a far greater
violence) the terms of terra nullius.
CP: But the problem of such a 'ground' also seems to be
there in your argument with respect to 'history': in the necessary
pre-requisite of a ground which is presumably non-historical,
since it is brought to history, on the one hand, and your many
references to the 'specific', the (concrete' etc. which would seem
to imply that a 'sphere of non-violence' needs to come from
history, on the other hand. Coming from outside of history and
from within it, such a ground would then appear as the condition
and the consequence of what you seem to be calling 'critique':
presumably the task of a 'disentanglement of violence and nonviolence' and so, it would seem, of the belated grounding of
critique's own possibility.
I will just add that it is exactly this belatedness tharDerrida
takes up in the circular relation between justice (,non-violence')
and Jaw ('violence') - though bear in mind that what Derrida
names as law is already subject to the problematisation of its
closure etc. It wQuldse>em, then, that this difficulty of
disentangling oneself from violence) where the task of this
disentangling can only take place in terms which are not - and
cannot, before this task is over, be - disentangled from violence,
is exactly the problem. And it is, of course, this which I have
tried to raise in the context of terra nullius.
BR: I have no idea what a ground outside ofhistory would
mean. History is more than temporality - myth is a condition of
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the absence of history even though it characterises a long period
of human existence (and still prevails - as Benjamin says, while
there is one beggar there is still myth). The ground of history, if
such a thing makes sense (I mean reason not foundation - I will
come to this) would he something like the development of
modern consciousness through various formative experiences.
Critique is fundamentally self-referential within history per
se. However it is the object of critique that is subject to learning
processes as well as critique itself. The distinction here is between
limiting and enabling conditions. The possibility of critique is
the same as that of unsettlement, though its forms will be
historically and socially contingent (though not relative). By this
parenthetical I mean that critique cannot be forgotten, though it
can be repressed. Just so with what I call learning in the normative
domain - the wrong of terra nuJIius, that it is wrong, cannot be
forgotten, only repressed. Further, the insight into the normative
basis ofthis decision (even ifnot recognised within the judgment,
nor its consequences played out) draws on previous insights which
can only be repressed at the cost ofgreat suffering - and so lends
itself to potentially more profound insight etc. This is what I
mean by a concrete, fallible learning process - attention to
suffering, which is always particular.
Disclosing this ground 6f critique is my central concern;
and your entanglement with the notion of'unsettlemene appears
to me to be of the same character. In this regard, I suspect that
the dispute of what a concept of a 'ground' is/does is a
misunderstanding that could be easily cleared up between us.
Ground as reason (without a capital - in the sense that a desire
can be a reason to act), not foundation.
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CP: Consistently, the problem here as I see it is that of
formulating something like the 'sense' ofan outside which cannot
be presented 'as such' and, hence, cannot (without being missed
or lost (again» constitute a ground. And here, of course, the
struggle towards such a form ulation does - and I imagine that
on this we disagree - receive its impetus from the argument that,
in becoming a ground, in entering the field of a discoursel
economy that could only clarify/classify it ('the other') according
to a schema, a grammar, and so the generality of a language that
would always fail to grasp its singularity, this 'outside' - of nonviolence, for ~xample - is violated. Or, again with Derrida, it is
en-forced.

BR: Only if truth is understood as adequation,
representation etc. It seems to me that the Kantian schema (or at
least the subsumption model of understanding) has been
supposed here, and so informs thi~ criticism. That is, a different,
perhaps 'pragmatist' idea ofknowledge is simply not confronted
with this as a transcendental problem. I guess, this is the difference
between Derrida and Adorno; the latter sought to rescue the
non-conceptual from the concept using concepts (the only tools
of thought); which is to simultaneously rescue the concept from
itself.
CP: For me, this retrieval!rescue isn't possible without
(again) 'betraying' the 'non-conceptualisable. But I am still seeking
adequate formulations as to the way in which language is pervaded
(unsettled) by what it must lose (always the essential, the singular,
the referent) in order to 'be~: the way in which the origin, by
virtue ofits insufficien~insists as a concern for what is originated
but never, for this reason, founded.
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In this respect, I have found Derrida more thoughtful and
more rigorous than he is usually taken to be. His theorisation of
a justice that comes 'before' the law, but only retrospectively which is to say that this 'hefore' comes after a law that fails to
present a justice which is discernible (outside oflaw) only because
ofthis failure - provides an example ofthis problem oereference'.
It is, moreover, this 'mystique' of the referent which is also
addressed in all of Derrida's work on 'the supplement', on
'iterability' and so on.

BR: I agree that these lapses can form the basis of an
interrogation of the failure of language, however this must be
undertaken determinately, ie in each case. This is because this
failure is (and here is where an apparent tension with your
prospectus arises - at least, for me, it was the 'flashpoint') an
historical failure - both at the ·level of the concept, and the nonconcept\lal. Proper conceptualisation of this failure also involves
consideration of the non-conceptual, and so must be particular
to every language game, indeed every concept/utterance. Only
on this basis which your approach erases could your idea of
unsettlement .have any heuristic value - eg how could it have
directed you to examine jterra nullius?

CP: Your use of 'betrayal' gets somewhere near to what I
have in mind, although here there is a whole question of realism.
For me, there is a temporal difficulty indicated, as I have said, by
the problem ofwhat comes 'before the law'. Certainl}', this 'before'
is betrayed. But in the sense that it is both revealed and wronged
by what is, succinctly; neither law's closure nor its openness. More
precisely, this 'before) is revealed because it is wronged. Hence it
is not simply revealed.
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BR: I think what is at stake between our perspectives can
be usefully characterised through the tension between Adorno
and Derrida. As emblematic of this tension (and so, of course,
merely provisional), I will quote Jay Bernstein on this difference:

Like Adorno, Derrida places non-identity at the 'margins'
of identity thinking, the outside that makes the inside possible
while simultaneously eluding its grasp (comprehension). But there
really is no 'other' for Derrida except in terms of the
(transcendentally conditioned) failure of identity thinking to
totalize itself, to achieve presence and self-presence. And while
this gesture temporarily prevents triumphal history from
unproblematically laying claim to the trophies of culture, it
equally prohibits cognition ofwhat the other, underside ofculture
was and is. The moments ofexcess in texts are hardly equivalent
to the comprehension of those texts as equally documents of
barbarism, even if we concede that, perhaps, differance etc. are
transcendental markers for that other history. The deconstructive
gesture can do no more than interrupt effective historical
con~ciousness while making the law governing that history
necessarily unknown and unknowable.

CP: Bernstein's point that 'there really is no "other" for
Derrida except in terms of the... failure of identity thinking to
totalise itself' is a problem for me. Derrida opens texts, concepts
etc. up to an 'outside' .which is not, 'in itself', his concern to
conceprualise and so, for him, to totalise. The other is other by
virtue of its non-conceptualisability. And, in this sense, its
otherness names a relation: a relation of obscurity. This is a
difficult point to express, but it is not dear to me that Bernstein
really 'gets' Derridas concern here.
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Is there 'really' any 'other'? Not (as other) outside of this
relation. How could the other be 'rea!'? Again, of course, not as
'other'. Bernstein's characterisation of Derrida, in this respect,
would only seem accurate ifthe 'is' in his sentence were italicised
to signal the problem of presenting/presencing the other which
is, ofcourse, Derrida's concern. Re-reading Bernstein, in this way,
the difficulty ofengagement here perhaps becomes a little dearer.

It is this 'obscurity ofthe other' (not, of course, intrinsically
but only 'in relation' to law, language etc.) which Bernstein reads
as a 'prohibition of cognition'. Or, more exapansively: 'the
deconstructive gesture can do no more than interrupt effective
historical consciousness while making the law governing that
history necessarily unknown and unknowable'. But the 'terms'
ofdeconstruction do not so much 'prohibit cognition' as maintain
its limits and so a vigilance with respect to its claim to a cognition
(which, as cognition, and given the terms in which Derrida moves,
could never be) ofthe other. Despite Bernstein's tone, therefore,
this 'unknowability' does not imply a resignation or refusal of
cognition ·or the passing of desire. Rather, as Lyotard has said, it
is a matter of bearing witness (in an impossible responsiveness)
to what is (therefore) unpresentable: but which, in this
unpresentability, is 'there' in, moreover, the singular failure of its
presentation. Or, with Blanchot, in the silence of (the word)
silence, the writing of the disaster... etc.
There is, then, something ofa proximity to Blanchot here,
particularly in his elaboration of this 'writing of the disaster': as
the effort to represent, to write, the disaster; and as the writing
that the disaster does, as it ruins this effort, this writing. Here,
the disaster writes'itself, or it expresses itself, in!as this ruin: the
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'failure' oflanguage - although now as a kind of,success' because,
in this failure, the disaster is 'there'. Although it is not, of course,
represented. It is not there (as such' or, extending the point, in
any way that could provide any kind of a ground. Heidegger's
elaboration of the 'speaking or languaging of language', how
language 'needs and uses human speech', in order to sound (as
'the peal of stillness') would also seem to open this out in the
direction ofBenjamin. As you sa}', the echo ofwhat language has
lost is 'there' in language. And I cannot but be reminded of these
formulations from Heidegger and, particularly for me, Blanchot:
'my language kills' but 'speech is the life of [this] death'. Here,
then, I sense that we are quite close.
BR: The limits on cognition and the view that the nonconceptual sphere arises because ofthe inadequacy ofthe concept
strike me as derivative of, here, a linguistic idealism.

First, the experience of the disaster as disaster (and not
just as stuff that happened) is clearly the ground of its own
expression (just so you see how I word use the word ground);
without It, the failure of language would not be expressing
anything - and here, I would strongly urge that, despite
Benjamin's occasional and contradictory failings in this area, we
can do without such hoary metaphysical claims that what is
expressed is the fall oflanguage, or the forgetting ofBeing. Rather,
what is expressed in such 'failures' of language is the suffering of
concrete human identities, mediated through the possible
conditions onexpression ofexperience which any given language
both limits and permits.
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Second, language fails to 'represent' the disaster only on a
metaphysical understanding on representation. Once we move
beyond the limitations of this concept of truth and/or justice,
we will be able to 'represent' the disaster (or any determinate
wrong) in a non-effusive (and therefore heuristically valuable)
way. Something here reminds me of Schiller in reverse - that
rather than have the experience expand the concept, the
limitations of the concept (or, in truth, the form of the concept)
is used to obscure the experience.

CP: I wonder about your concept of 'experience' when,
for me, what is at stake here is, again with Derrida, something
like an experience which cannot be experienced: where it is in
this experience that the non-conceptualisable is 'there' because it
cannot be experienced.
In this regard, our differences no doubt arise over something
like Honneth's framework which, it seems to me, is constrained
to be only ever a recognition of the same and, hence, a reduction
of the other's experience. My concern, then, is to dicit something
of this 'experience' in Jhe failure of conceptualisation. And here,
the demand for conceptualisation devolves upon that failure and,
indeed, the 'sense' ofa conceptual inadequacy according to which
the demand for recognition/justice arises~ but always remains to
be met.
So, yes, I take these conceptualltheoreticallimitations more
seriously than, perhaps, you would. But this is because, for me,
the singularity of justice is (there', is 'experienced', because it
cannot be brought to conceptualisation or to experience.

241

Perrin 6- Ripperger

Silence has taken me farthest here: particularly with respect
to the temporality of a .silence that, in its perpetuation, could
not be heard and which, therefore, can only be heard if it is
spoken/broken. Here, one could conceive of the effort to speak
in order to communicate this silence: an effort that would, of
course, be both violent - since it would say too much - and nonviolent - since in/as this 'too much' (also 't~o little') one might
discern something else, something other (I should add that it is
the way in which language here might 'manifest' - not what but
- that 'there is' something which it cannot say which is the
important point). This, then, would be to grasp, to try and grasp,
the way in which a word like silence - and what is generally
called 'writing' or 'literature' in post-structuralist thought - is at
odds with, or unsettled in, itself. Perhaps, then, this would be to
get somewhere near what Blanchot has called 'the silence of the
word silence'.
BR: Silence may not be able to be heard, but is readily
experi~nced. Silence may also be reactive. But, is the point really
the silence of silence (which has the benefit of irony) or rather
the silence ofevery word/concept? Would not the silence ofjustice
be more interesting? I mean, I guess, on your terms, every word!
concept performs the same operation ofsilencing as does 'silence',
and for the same reason. Is the silence of silence any different to
the silence of 'justice'?
_As discussed above, my basic orientation to 'determinate
negation' comes out ,here again -so the question is, what does
'silence' silence in any particular usage and how (and so, what
also does it reveal)? In this respect, a version of Adorno's ideas
about the way concepts 'preform and truncate' the non-
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conceptual seems preferable. Although silence can 'speak' it
cannot say anything/be heard until interpreted/experienced - and
this interpretation must simultaneously modify the concepts it
is employing in order that it does not reirtscribe the silence, and
it can only do this ifit partakes in an historically situated learning
process.

CP: The conceptual failure/non-conceptual success which
the silence ofsilence tries to get at seeks, as with any deconstructive
reading, to elicit this failure/success in its singularity. Words, texts,
concepts, are inadequate to themselves and, as I have said, it is
out of this inadequacy that the non-conceptualisable arises. It
does so, therefore, according to the terms which, one might say,
it 'resists': the silence of (the word) silence, and so, the alterity of
alterity, ,the justice ofjustice etc. such that, in each instance, one
might say that what is, in one sense, betrayed (wronged) is, of
course, betrayed (revealed) in another sense - and, of course,
.
Vlce versa.
BR: I take what you say about the singularty ~ I do not
think we are very di§tant on that point. Also, I think your
comments on the (non) experience of that which cannot be
experienced go to the heart of the matter. And this is where my,
I guess rather obtrusive, comments on Kant come in..
Kant, of course, argues that the conditions of experience
cannot themselves directly be an object of experience but can be
thought - if we are generous, this would seem to be what we are
talking about, especially ifwe come up with some better sense of
'singularity' than Kant could. Now my sense is that this singularity
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must also come from the side of the (object', otherwise these
conditions ofexperience will remail1: both 'purely' tra!1scendentaI
and somewhat effusive (ie. non-singular). 'Object' is, of course,
an unfortunate term, but I know you will be charitable. As Kant
would say, there must be something of which the appearance is
an appearance. So, again, the singularity is more than a specific
failure (and also, therefore, a success - 'on this point I entirely
agree) of language; or, perhaps rather, language fails specifically
because of something more than its non-identity.
Now, the conditions of the failure are also protected by
the Kantian block; however, the experience of failure is an
experience (not a non-experience). Yet the conditions of failure
can be retrieved conceptually (this is the task of philosophy for
Hegel - and is what characterises his thought as speculative),
which is also the bringing to thought of the non-conceptual
'object'. Your paradoxical formulation of'experience' is a challenge
to transform the concept in the direction of the non-conceptual,
and I would seek to develop Honneth's work on the recognition
of/by the other. (The Adornoese for what it is that 'appears' in
this failure and success of language is 'constellation' - as in the
idea ofstars 'forming' a constellation - being both real and illusory
etc.) This involves the transformation of the concept itself In
this way the block on experience, which is social as well as
conceptual, can be transformed. I do not think we disagree on
this last point.
CP: Our difference here may be a matter ofemphasis: mine
upon (not Just the fact, but) the way that conceptual frameworks
always fail to recognise; yours, I guess, upon the learning processes
which you invoke. Perhaps, then) the question is whether one
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gets any (closer' to the experience ofthe other. Here, although in
a sense just repeating the problem, our difference may well be
that I (also) think one does but, importantly, only in the
recognition that one does not; again, in the recognition that the
experience of the other is an experience which cannot be
experienced.
For me, then, it is as the High Court in Mabo circumscibes
the limits of its own capacity to do justice, and hence to be nonviolent, that it attests to such an excess: here, of what comes
'before' it. As such, it betrays the force of its law in both senses
(in its violence and its vitality). It is here that I discern the
unsettlement which I have tried to indicate and, according to
which, such a decision cannot simply be regarded as a further,
fateful and repetitious, instance of terra nullius.
BR: This is correct. But this is the limit of the law to do
justice. That is, theoretically, the limits on undecideability that
law must impose should be seen as enabling, not limiting,
conditions for -the articulation of justice..
CP: But out of the High Court's acknowledgment that according to existing meanings - justice cannot be done, which
is to say, out of this unsettlement, isn't it exactly the demand for
'thinking', and for 'thinking otherwise' that can be heard, echoing
throughout its decision in Mabo?
BR: Yes.
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